By Davide Vampa

A New Space for the Populist Radical Right in Scotland

Scotland may be on the brink of a political shift. Polling suggests that Nigel Farage’s Reform UK – a party widely associated with populist radical right politics – could win seats in the Scottish Parliament for the first time. In some surveys, Reform is even outperforming Labour and the Conservatives, positioning itself as the main challenger to the governing Scottish National Party (SNP). While much could change before the next election, the trend is clear: the electoral space for right-wing populism is expanding in Scotland.

Much of the current debate focuses on uniquely Scottish or UK-wide factors behind Reform’s rise. But Scotland’s apparent immunity to right-wing populism in the past – and its possible unravelling now – can be better understood through a broader lens. Looking across Europe reveals patterns, triggers, and consequences that offer crucial lessons for what may lie ahead.

Scotland’s resilience to radical right populism has long rested on the dominance of constitutional debates, particularly during the 2010s. These debates focused on Scotland’s place within the UK and shaped party competition and voter alignments. They also allowed the SNP to absorb or neutralise many of the grievances that populist radical right parties elsewhere in Europe have successfully exploited. But those foundations are shifting. With independence now less dominant in public discourse, space is opening for new political narratives – and Reform UK is seeking to fill that vacuum.

One key reason Scotland has resisted radical right populist movements is the way they have been perceived. In the UK, parties on the radical right have often been associated with English nationalism and hostility to devolution. Even right-leaning Scottish unionist voters were reluctant to support parties like UKIP and the Brexit Party, which appeared to articulate a vision of Britain that excluded or marginalised Scotland. These parties rarely engaged with Scotland on its own terms and were seen as tone-deaf to the complex and plural identities within the Union.

Lessons from Italy: Salvini and the League

However, one lesson from abroad – specifically from Italy – is that perceptions of populist radical right parties can change dramatically. A striking example is the transformation of Italy’s Northern League. Initially a populist, anti-southern party advocating greater autonomy for the wealthy North, the League was widely detested in southern Italy. Its rhetoric portrayed the South as parasitic and backward, calling for a federal or even separatist model that would reduce the South’s political influence and access to resources.

But under Matteo Salvini’s leadership, from 2013 onwards, the League rebranded. It dropped ‘Northern’ from its name, softened its regionalist message, and adopted a national populist agenda. The party redirected its anti-establishment rhetoric from Rome to Brussels, portraying the EU as the new enemy. In doing so, it extended its appeal across Italy, including in the very regions it had previously vilified. In the 2018 general election, the ‘new’ League became a significant political player in all southern Italian regions. It even surpassed 10 per cent of the vote in areas that had been hostile territory – and where it had previously been virtually non-existent – such as Latium (around Rome), Sardinia, and Abruzzo. By 2019, the League had become Italy’s largest party and the second-largest in the South, with over 20 per cent of the vote in that part of the country – a remarkable turnaround that highlights the flexibility, or ‘chameleonic’ nature, of successful right-wing populists.

This transformation was enabled by changing political conditions and the crisis of Italy’s mainstream parties. The collapse of the traditional party system left many voters politically homeless and opened the door for a repackaged League. While Scotland is not experiencing the same degree of systemic collapse, it is entering a period of political flux. The SNP’s long-standing dominance is under pressure, Labour is attempting a comeback, and the Conservatives are struggling to remain relevant. Reform UK is exploiting this volatility by recalibrating its message to resonate more directly with Scottish voters – downplaying its English roots and instead emphasising broader right-wing populist themes, such as anti-elitism, anti-immigration, disillusionment with the political establishment, opposition to net zero policies, and engagement in the so-called culture wars.

In this context, Farage’s trajectory may echo Salvini’s – albeit in a different direction when it comes to Europe. Before Brexit, Brussels was the main target of the anti-establishment rhetoric promoted by Farage’s earlier parties – first UKIP, then the Brexit Party – and their Euroscepticism served as an implicit vehicle for English nationalism. In the post-Brexit landscape, however, Reform UK has reframed this message, shifting its focus away from the EU and concentrating almost exclusively on political elites within Britain, including those in the devolved nations. In this reframing, those in power at all levels – from Westminster to Holyrood and Cardiff Bay – are cast as enemies of the people.

Like Salvini in southern Italy, Farage is capitalising on a more fluid political environment. In Scotland, the independence question no longer appears to structure party competition as decisively as it once did. For nearly a decade, the SNP and the Conservatives – on opposite sides of the constitutional divide – dominated by framing politics around the Union, marginalising more moderate pro-devolution parties such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats. That landscape is now fragmenting. Labour briefly benefited from this shift with a fragile and short-lived resurgence in 2024, but the broader vacuum remains. Into this space, emerging populist themes – ranging from opposition to net zero policies and the so-called ‘war on woke’ to a wider anti-establishment mood – may gain growing traction, offering fertile ground for Reform UK.

The Risks of Territorial Expansion

Still, Salvini’s strategy in Italy was not without risks. While the League initially thrived in a volatile political landscape, its rapid ascent was built on shaky foundations. After a period of remarkable growth, the party’s support declined sharply – falling from Italy’s largest party between 2019 and 2020 to a mid-sized force. Yet it remained transformed: no longer confined to the North, but now a national presence. This expansion, however, brought internal tensions, as the party struggled to balance the demands of its traditional northern base with the expectations of a broader, more diverse electorate. Similar strains could emerge if Reform UK succeeds in expanding into Scotland and Wales. Growth beyond its English heartlands may offer short-term gains and help establish Farage’s party as an authentic UK-wide actor. Yet it would also pose strategic challenges – forcing the party to reconcile competing territorial interests and policy preferences within a single populist platform.

Populist parties, particularly on the right, often thrive by seizing moments of political instability and repackaging familiar grievances. But translating rapid growth into long-term relevance is far more difficult. As the Italian case shows, territorial expansion can be a powerful dynamic – but also a source of strain and eventual decline. For Reform UK, the real challenge may not be whether it can rise across Britain, but whether it can hold together once it does.

Davide Vampa is Senior Lecturer in Territorial Politics and Co-Director of the Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Edinburgh.