by Clare Rice
The 2024 General Election was always going to send wide ripple effects through Northern Ireland’s politics – what nobody could be sure about, despite much speculation, was where exactly the earthquakes would occur.
Of the 18 constituencies, multiple saw contests that were too close to call ahead of the election. Constituency boundary changes since 2019 that had the potential to both make and end marginal contests also presented a new challenge to the already complex mix.
In 2017, Brexit pushed Northern Ireland’s political representation in Westminster to the extremes of the spectrum, with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin electing ten and seven MPs respectively, while one seat was won by an independent candidate. 2019 saw this change slightly: the DUP remained the largest party with eight seats, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) returned with two MPs, and the Alliance Party also won a seat. Now, Westminster will see an even more diverse range of views from Northern Ireland.
The results were as follows (change from 2019 in brackets):
Sinn Féin: 7 (-)
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): 5 (-3)
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): 2 (-)
Alliance Party: 1 (-)
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): 1 (+1)
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV): 1 (+1)
Independent: 1 (+1)
There are a number of headlines that emerged from the results - two key themes from these that demonstrate how seismic an election this was for politics both in and of Northern Ireland are considered herein.
Nationalism and Sinn Féin’s consolidation as the largest party at all levels
The battle within nationalism for seats was far from the most gripping aspect of this election. It was expected that Sinn Féin would retain its 7 seats, and it did that comfortably. This included Fermanagh and South Tyrone, once the UK’s most marginal seat but now securely held with a majority of 4571. The party also rivalled the DUP in East Londonderry, coming within 179 votes of taking the historically safe unionist seat.
For Sinn Féin, these results mean that it is now the largest party at all levels of government in Northern Ireland (local government, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and Westminster). This is hugely symbolic for a party that seeks Irish unification, and these results have further bolstered calls from the party for a ‘Border Poll’ to be called – i.e. a referendum on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. However, comments from the new Secretary of State, Hilary Benn, indicate that the electoral successes of nationalism are not sufficient alone for him to take any such decision imminently.
For the SDLP, which also aspires to Irish unification, the aim was to retain its two seats in Foyle and the new constituency of South Belfast and Mid Down. It did this, albeit with reduced majorities. When being sworn into their roles, Party Leader, Colum Eastwood, stated he would read the “empty formula in order to represent [his] constituents but it is under protest”, while Claire Hanna spoke in Irish to state that her “allegiance is to the people of South Belfast and Mid Down and I say these words in order to serve them”.
While Sinn Féin operates an abstentionist policy whereby MPs do not take their seats in Westminster, SDLP MPs do, albeit reluctantly as these comments demonstrate. This means that while half of Northern Ireland’s seats are held by nationalist MPs, only two will take their places in the House of Commons.
Unionism and the consequences of a fractured unity in purpose
Fractures within unionism are not new, but they have become more pronounced in the wake of Brexit, the Windsor Framework, and the ‘Safeguarding the Union’ deal reached between the DUP and the UK Government that ended a two-year collapse of Northern Ireland’s political institutions earlier this year.
All the unionist parties are united in opposition to Irish unification but they articulate different versions of political unionism, and this fragmentation has become fraught with anger and at times toxic discourse between parties. Consolidation of unionist votes to ensure sufficient numbers to secure unionist (and not nationalist or Alliance) representation in marginal constituencies was always going to be a tougher task under these circumstances. Parties are acutely aware of this, reflected, for example, in the decision for a sole unionist candidate to run in Fermanagh and South Tyrone. The absence of such strategies in more constituencies was angrily criticised by the DUP’s Sammy Wilson following his re-election, itself a much tighter race than the party anticipated.
In a tough night for the DUP, three seats were lost and another two came close to the same outcome. In North Antrim, once regarded as the DUP’s safest seat having been held by the party for 54 years, the Leader of the TUV, Jim Allister, defeated Ian Paisley by 450 votes. At the time of writing, it remains unclear if Allister will take the Reform UK whip in the House of Commons given the formal link that remains between the two parties (despite Nigel Farage backing Paisley in the election). The loss of this seat, synonymous with the origins of the DUP, marks a disastrous turn of events for the party and will prompt a fundamental re-evaluation of its future direction.
In South Antrim, the DUP was defeated by former Health Minister, Robin Swann of the UUP. In Lagan Valley, the seat held for 27 years by former DUP Leader, Sir Jeffrey Donaldson, was won by the Alliance Party and for the first time the constituency is not represented by a unionist MP. The only positive story for the party was that it retained East Belfast, where Gavin Robinson faced Alliance Party Leader, Naomi Long.
The difficulty for unionism is that while there are calls for a new approach to unionist politics, there is no clear momentum or obvious path towards it that would not entail an electoral cost for one or all of the parties involved. After this election, there is little incentive for the parties that have benefitted from this fracturing to set about healing it. In the face of increasing debate on Irish unification, as well as the (symbolic and actual) impact of Northern Ireland’s specific post-Brexit arrangements, this is a challenge that needs to be confronted with haste if it is to be curbed.
What next?
From all angles, Northern Ireland needs to work. Currently, it feels that little here does. This election presented an opportunity to refocus the parties, and the culmination of multiple complex elements has led to a set of results that will be processed for some time to come.
When the Prime Minister visited Northern Ireland in the days after taking office, he spoke of “resetting relationships”. Meetings between the Secretary of State and leaders from the Irish Government have also indicated that this sentiment carries through to improving Anglo-Irish relations. The Labour Party was instrumental in bringing about the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998 and in the early days of the peace process, so there is a deep history and familiarity that brings a sense of hope that this change at the national level will also be a positive one for Northern Ireland.
So far, it has started well – but there is a big difference between words and actions. In Northern Ireland, action is all that will matter. Only time will tell if this new configuration of leadership and local representation will deliver the change that is so badly needed for the people of Northern Ireland.