What Westminster can learn from the devolved nations
By Phillip Gilfus,
Louis Brandeis, an associate justice of the US Supreme Court, wrote in his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932), that, ‘It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State (sic) may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’ This idea of the (now) fifty American state governments as ‘laboratories of democracy’ has permeated throughout that nation’s political history. Whether that maxim has proven to be true is another story.
The United Kingdom, of course, is not a federal system. And yet, the devolution of the nations has allowed for specific ‘experiments’ in democratic practices, from the adoption of different electoral systems to the use of public petitions, from enhanced parliamentary committee powers to expanding the franchise. For example, the Representation of the People Bill 2026, currently under scrutiny by the House of Lords, contains a provision that lowers the age of voter eligibility to 16 for Westminster elections, as well as Northern Ireland elections. To the extent this proposal has been the subject of public debate in England, it is well-noted that 16- and 17-year-olds have already been permitted to vote in devolved and local elections in Scotland since 2015 and Wales since 2020. When examining electoral systems, other than Westminster elections, no elected official outside of England is elected using first-past-the-post, other than Welsh councillors. Single Transferable Vote (STV) is used throughout Northern Ireland and in local Scottish elections, whilst the Scottish Parliament continues using its mixed system. The Senedd now operates under a fully proportional system. At the recent Labour conference, Prime Minister Andy Burnham has now raised the possibility that UK electoral reform may be on the horizon.
Another significant ‘experiment’ in how representative democracy operates in the UK is reflected in Holyrood’s Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act 2025, wherein dual mandates were banned for MSPs. Dual mandates (sometimes more colloquially referred to as ‘double-jobbing’) refers to the act of holding more than one elected office simultaneously. The Scottish Parliament approved three Scottish Government secondary statutory instruments (SSIs) wherein MSPs are disqualified from also serving as an MP, a peer, and/or as a local councillor, following the 2026 parliamentary election. By comparison, Wales chose to ban dual mandates much earlier. The Wales Act of 2014 first disqualified MSs from also acting as MPs, and this was expanded in 2020 to also include local councillors and peers who refused to take a leave of absence during their term in the Senedd. Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) have been disqualified from serving as MPs since the 2016 election (local NI councillors are also unable to serve as MLAs, MPs, or peers). Given this state of play across the devolved nations, Westminster now stands alone in allowing MPs to also serve as local councillors.
The arguments for restricting dual mandates generally centre on the practical and representational difficulties associated with holding two elected offices at the same time. Combining mandates create competing demands on a member’s time, particularly where responsibilities require attendance at different institutions across notable geographic distances. An MP serving simultaneously as a councillor, for example, must balance Westminster committee and plenary sessions with local committee meetings, council business, and constituency responsibilities. Dual mandates can also raise questions about conflicting representational roles, particularly where the interests or responsibilities associated with one office do not align with those of the other. While conflicts of interest are always noted by members, it may be difficult to know which ‘electoral hat’ a member is wearing at any given time. Further, remuneration provides another source of public criticism, especially where holding two offices entails receiving two salaries or sets of expenses.
The practice of dual mandates also has consequences on political recruitment and the ability of new candidates to assume office. When one politician occupies two elected positions, fewer offices are available for other prospective candidates. Parties may have an incentive to rely on an established and electorally successful politician to contest a second office rather than select a less proven neophyte candidate. Restrictions on dual mandates can therefore be justified not only in terms of members’ workloads and representational responsibilities, but also as a means of widening opportunities for political participation.
However, dual office holding remains common throughout Europe and, specifically, England. It would not be rare to discover that one’s parish, borough, and/or county councillor are all the same person. In 2025, ITV found that 26 MPs served as councillors, with most stating that they would continue in both offices, despite there being questions about their attendance rates at local council meetings. In continental Europe, the French term cumul des mandats (‘cumulation of mandates’) is used to refer the phenomena of multiple office holding, both historically in France and its long practice throughout the continent, for example, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland.
Regardless of the policy arguments surrounding this democratic practice, constitutional change in the UK is often thought about in terms of Westminster permitting the nations to expand (or contract) their devolved powers. However, devolution has also revealed the ability of the devolved bodies to venture past the traditional practices of the UK, which often results in Westminster playing catch up years later and adopting proven reforms. Whether the devolved parliaments realise it, the (varied) ability of the nations to adopt their own governing approaches serves as a soft power in creating opportunities for wider change at the UK-level. As greater public focus occurs around Westminster electoral reform, MPs, the media, and the English public do not need to venture far to see how other electoral options work. Does the mixed system of Scotland provide a proper mix of constituency roles and proportionality? Is STV a more proven system for both? Whether it is banning dual mandates, electoral reform, or a host of other practices, England finds itself in the minority within the UK. They are quite fortunate that many ‘experiments’ exist within the devolved nations from which to examine best democratic practices.
Phillip Gilfus is a post-viva PhD candidate and Associate Lecturer at the University of Reading.