Potential and limits for a ‘democratization from below’ in Venezuela
By Rogerio Schlegel and Juan C. Olmeda
Recent events in Venezuela have resulted in renewed interest in regime change in that country. Discussions about Venezuelan democratization typically rest on the assumption that regime transition can only result if initiated from the centre, paying less attention to the possibility that democratic pressures might emanate from the country’s federal units. Venezuela is one of Latin America’s four federal countries, alongside Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In federal systems, authoritarian regimes tend to centralize power in the executive branch not only politically but also territorially, encroaching on the competencies of subnational authorities. Nevertheless, federations under authoritarian rule should not be automatically dismissed as façade federations. The impact of autocracy varies substantially across different dimensions of authority, over time, and according to the ruling elites’ ideology, among other factors.
Democratic erosion in Venezuela has profoundly reshaped territorial political dynamics and constrained the actions of subnational opposition elites. The governments of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–2026) relied on flawed regional elections, the targeted punishment of governors, and the creation of parallel subnational political-administrative bodies to consolidate central control. This trend not only reflected the entrenchment of authoritarian rule but also actively contributed to the erosion of democracy. For example, strategies designed to skew electoral competition in favour of the ruling party were tested and refined at the subnational level before being applied nationally. Boycotts of regional elections were used as a justification to bar parties at national elections.
The lack of attention to Venezuela’s federal character has occluded discussions about the extent to which a process of “democratization from below” might be possible in the country. Recent experiences in Brazil and Mexico suggest that democratization processes can benefit substantially from subnational dynamics. In the following sections, we examine the recent evolution of federalism in Venezuela and assess the potential and limits for its “democratization from below”, drawing on comparative insights from the Brazilian and Mexican cases.
Federalism, a neglected ideal in Venezuela
Venezuela is a federation established following the holding-together model, in the aftermath of independence from Spain in the early 19th century. The federal idea was central to a number of its 26 constitutions. Notably, the 1999 Constitution drafted during the Chávez’s presidency – and still in force – defines the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as a “decentralized Federal State” (Article 4). The federation comprises 23 states, two federal territories, one federal district, and 72 federal dependencies (maritime islands in the Caribbean Sea). The local level consists of over 300 municipalities, which are largely dependent on and supervised by the two upper tiers of government.
Despite this formal commitment to federalism, centralism combined with caudillismo—the rule of local warlords —prevailed in the 19th century. Authoritarian regimes in the early 20th century, particularly the dictatorships under the influence of General Juan Vicente Gómez, contributed to the further centralization of state power. The country entered a prolonged democratic period in 1958. For decades, the political system was dominated by two parties: the social-democratic Acción Democrática (AD) and the Christian-democratic Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI). During this period, Venezuela saw a peaceful transfer of presidential power in six consecutive elections and was considered "the most stable mass democracy in South America".
Though Venezuela was formally a federation since the 19th century, it held state gubernatorial elections for the first time in 1989. The same year, a mounting economic crisis, combined with the erosion of the legitimacy of the two-party system, contributed to recurring demonstrations and riots in Caracas and other cities. Political elites responded with administrative and political decentralization. During the 1990s, the country experienced a growing fragmentation of the party system, fostered by territorial political dynamics. The failed coup attempt of 1992, led by Chávez, along with the pressure from opposition politicians including state governors, contributed to the promotion of decentralization for a decade.
By the time Chávez won his first presidential election at the end of 1998, public opinion strongly favoured decentralization. However, his project to create a Fifth Republic prioritized a new constitution, a reconfiguration of relations among social classes, and the promotion of direct democracy. The proclaimed Bolivarianism emphasized making Venezuela politically and economically independent. The 1999 Constitution introduced sweeping changes to the political system, expanding social and economic rights, including those for indigenous peoples. It also centralized government resources, reduced the power of the national legislature (including the replacement of the bicameral Congress with a unicameral Assembly), and fundamentally increased presidential authority.
Chávez's administrations were accompanied by successful electoral campaigns at the state level. In 2000, Chávez's party – the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimento V República or MVR) won 10 of the 23 gubernatorial elections. Scholars described the situation using the concept of “asymmetric party fragmentation”: the MVR became increasingly unified and dominant, while the opposition fragmented. The party later created by Chávez to replace the MVR, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), won 20 governorships in 2013. Most analysts agree that Chávez sought to win regional elections without systematic fraud, but he definitely curtailed the competences of opposition governors.
Nicolás Maduro acceded to the presidency after Chavez’s death in 2013. The new administration faced a critical situation. A deepening economic crisis and sharply declining popularity left little room for regime continuity without electoral manipulation. The national government further encroached on the power of opposition governors by delaying mandatory fiscal transfers and creating parallel administrative structures, called “protectores”, which administered their own budgets. Some of the major opposition presidential candidates between 2000 and 2018 were former governors.
By the end of the 2010s, the manipulation of electoral rules, the opposition’s reactive boycotts, and the systematic curtailment of subnational policymaking authority had left the governing party in control over the states. A few opposition governors, usually less vocal, were the exception. In 2021, the PSUV won 19 of the 23 governorships. In 2025, the coalition Gran Pólo Patriotico Simón Bolivar, an alliance of the PSUV with smaller left-wing parties, won in every state but one, according to official records.The sole exception was Cojedes, where Alberto Galíndez was reelected by an alternative coalition running on a largely regional platform. Under the current conditions, Chavismo controls not only the national executive but also monopolizes constituents units, with little room for the opposition at the subnational level.
Despite the sustained process of democratic backsliding both at the national and subnational levels, the likehood of transitioning to democracy is not null for Venezuela. Indeed, other federal Latin American countries show that a path from below might be an option. In the following sections we explore the cases of Brazil and Mexico to highlight some comparative lessons.
The role of directly elected governors in Brazil
Regional politics played a key role in the Brazilian democratization of the 1980s. The military regime held state-level elections for most of its 21-year rule (1964-1985). Governors were indirectly selected by regional assemblies that were themselves directly elected, though they were purged of politicians openly critical of the regime, and contests were marked by significant manipulation by central officials.
The reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections and the allowance of opposition candidates representing a broader range of political forces constituted a decisive step toward democratization in 1982. Two four-year electoral cycles took place in the states before the liberalization process arrived at a direct election for president, held only in 1989.
The military regime was able to control the pace of the transition to the extent that a constitutional amendment providing for direct presidential elections was rejected by a compliant Congress in 1984. However, opposition governors exerted pressure for further reforms, including the convening of a national constituent assembly, which ultimately consolidated democratic rule and resulted in far-reaching decentralization.
Brazil’s experience suggests that regional elites can continue to play a pivotal political role even after losing direct access to key financial and political resources during a centralized dictatorship. Both institutional design and the channels through which territorial interests were articulated contributed to this outcome. A previous democratization process in the country reveals that this path cannot be taken for granted. When Getulio Vargas' dictatorship (1937-1945) came to an end in the aftermath of World War II, a top-down liberalization prioritized national dynamics and elections, and the following constitutional assembly delivered significantly less decentralization than might have been expected.
‘Democratization from below’ in Mexico
A similar process of “democratization from below” unfolded in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. For most of the 20th century, despite the country’s formal federal structure and regular elections, the Mexican political system was dominated by a hegemonic party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI). For decades, the PRI controlled the presidency, all governorships, and both chambers of the National Congress.
This scenario remained in place between 1930 and 1980, but began to erode toward the end of that period with the gradual opening of the political system, particularly at the subnational level. Opposition parties became increasingly competitive and started to win seats in Congress and positions at the subnational elections, including municipalities and state governorships. In 1989, a non-PRI candidate was elected state governor for the first time, in Baja California. In 1997, the PRI lost its long-standing majority in the Chamber of Deputies. That same year, the mayor of Mexico City was elected by popular vote for the first time, and the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democratica or PRD) won the contest. Transformations in the political landscape reached a peak in 2000 when Vicente Fox, from the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional or PAN) was elected president, ending 70 years of uninterrupted PRI rule. Not surprisingly, Fox had served as an opposition governor during the 1990s.
Significant decentralizing reforms were enacted at the turn of the 21st century, in response to the political pressures generated by this landscape. First, subnational governments were assigned new responsibilities in the provision of public services such as education and healthcare. Second, national authorities decentralized an important portion of expenditures by creating a new type of federal transfer – the aportaciones (earmarked transfers) channeled through the Ramo 33 (Budgetary item 33), making subnational authorities responsible for a considerable portion of social spending. On the political front, offices that had previously been filled through presidential appointments were made subject to popular elections (most notably, the Distrito Federal’s Chief of Government). In addition, subnational opposition leaders were guaranteed that their electoral victories would be recognized, and local electoral commissions in charge of assuring clean and fair local elections were created.
Following Bolívar´s footsteps?
After a quarter century of Bolivarianism, Venezuela might be depicted as formally federal but de facto quasi-unitary. Over the course of its republican history, the country experienced little more than a decade of sustained administrative and electoral decentralization. This limited experience makes shortcuts to liberalization driven by regional dynamics—such as those observed in Brazil and Mexico—less likely to emerge in the near future. Nevertheless, this path to democratization should not be dismissed and may even be considered a potential strategy for the relevant players.
The significance of the regional landscape in Venezuela will depend on the extent to which state-level elites remain relevant. The kind of coalition prevalent among territorial elites and the degree of nationalization of politicians’ careers at this point are among the decisive elements to be accounted for.
Ironically, Simón Bolívar, the South American liberator who inspired Chávez and Maduro, at first envisioned the newly independent countries as federations, but was later led by practical experience to advocate for centralization. At the current critical juncture, Venezuela risks following his footsteps once again.
Rogerio Schlegel, Federal University of São Paulo, Brazil
Juan C. Olmeda, El Colegio de México, Mexico
This article represents the views of the authors, and not those of Regional & Federal Studies, the Centre on Constitutional Change, or the University of Edinburgh.