The Celtic Alliance
The fact that all three devolved governments in the United Kingdom are headed by nationalist First Ministers (1) represents a significant turning in the constitutional history of the union. So does their meeting in September to agree on their right to self-determination and to referendums to make it effective. This is not the first effort to forge a Celtic alliance. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were attempts to unite the Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalist movements but they failed because of sectarianism, disagreement between Home Rulers and separatists, differences about the priority of the Irish Question and the violence triggered by the 1916 Irish Rising. In recent decades, mainstream Scottish and Welsh nationalisms have given Sinn Féin a wide birth because of its links with the IRA and political violence. Plaid Cymru was the first to lift the cordon sanitaire, inviting Sinn Féin to its conference in 2019. First Minister Nicola Sturgeon declared that she would meet Sinn Féin Ministers as part of her official duties, but not on a party-to-party basis. The SNP has now decided that is time to put the history of violence behind them and that the Sinn Féin is democratically respectable. The recent meeting was explicitly party-to-party as governmental cooperation would require the consent of the unionist DUP. On the Irish side, however, there has historically been reluctance to become entangled in British debates about devolution, which might hold Irish nationalism back and dilute its particular concerns and priorities.
The main outcome of the meeting was a declaration of the right to self-determination of the three nations and the democratic right of each jurisdiction to hold referendums on their constitutional status whatever the view of the UK Government. There was a recognition that the starting point in each nation was different.
Northern Ireland already has the right to unify with the Republic by referendum. If there appears to be a majority for unification, the Secretary of State is obliged to arrange for a referendum. In that case a referendum would also be held in the south. The two together would constitute what the declaration refers to as the ‘nation’ as opposed to the ‘jurisdiction of Northern Ireland. Yet support for unification is still running at around a third of the voters in Northern Ireland, well short the necessary majority.
Support for independence in Scotland has been around 50 percent for the last decade and successive UK prime ministers have never denied that Scotland has a right to self-determination, insisting that the 2014 referendum was a one-off affair. Yet they have all refused to specify the conditions under which this right could be exercised. Andy Burnham, after throwaway comment that appeared to equate Scotland with Northern Ireland, has fallen into line with his predecessors.
Support for independence in Wales has increased in recent years but still hovers around 30 percent. While Plaid Cymru favours independence, it is not clear exactly what this means in the Welsh context.
Yet the union remains fragile as a support for succession is concentrated in the younger generations, providing a long-term centrifugal force. Two other elements are critical.
First is the (Republic of) Ireland where both the political class and the electors favour reunification in principle. Yet the traditional parties have been very cautious, seeing unity as a long-term aspiration after the requisite conditions have been put in place. Sinn Féin, now the principal opposition party, favours rapid action, marking them out from the governing parties in spite of the fact that a referendum is not on cards due to the lack of a potential majority in the North.
The second factor is England, where the future of the Union (as opposed to internal government of England) is hardly discussed. What has long marked English opinion is its relative indifference about the wider union, in contrast to the situation in other plurinational states such as Canada or Spain. So the question of who speaks for England in these debates is wide open.
There is little sign as yet of the main UK parties rising to the challenge. Andy Burnham started his premiership with a commitment to devolution but this was in practice all about English city-regions or extending the English model to Scotland and Wales. Like many of his predecessors he has shown a little understanding of the plurinational union. The Conservatives have shown little understanding either. Reform UK thinking on the union is under developed although they have been trying to forge a distinct Scottish form of national populism to overcome their reputation as an English nationalist party.
It is clear now that merely tinkering with devolution is not going to save the union but more radical thinking is needed. One necessary element is the federal idea. The United Kingdom will not become a federation. England is not interested, the nations are demographically unbalanced and a federation could not include the existing sovereign state of Ireland. Yet federal principles including the entrenchment of the existence and competences of the bodies are an essential starting point.
Another critical issue is Europe. While the UK was a member of the European Union, it was possible to sustain a generous devolution settlement, as issues of common concern across the UK and both parts of Ireland were dealt with at the European level. The Northern Ireland Protocol/ Windsor Framework has, to some degree, dealt with the Irish border, but in Scotland and Wales, devolved competences have effectively been curtailed by the UK Internal Market Act, intended to replicate the EU framework but in a more centralising way. If, as is likely, the UK is not going to rejoin the EU any time soon, then the closer the relationship they negotiate, then the more easily it can manage relations across ‘these islands’.
In the absence of radical thinking, it is possible that the United Kingdom will dissolve in one of two ways, or a combination of both. The first is a gradual ceding of competences to the devolved territories to the point that people ask what is the benefit in keeping what remains of the union. The second is a collapse at the centre, with an assertive English nationalism, a new break with Europe and a government of the populist right. Such breakdowns do not usually happen gradually and often take the political class by surprise as happened when the German Democratic Republic collapsed and West Germany was quite unprepared but obliged to respond. The political classes on both sides of the Irish Sea may be reading too much in the opinion polls that show no majority for secession in any of the three currently devolved territories but could certainly use some creative forward thinking.
- Although Northern Ireland has a co-equal Deputy First Minister.
Michael Keating is Professor Emeritus at the University of Aberdeen and Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh.